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Self to Self 
J. David Velleman 
Images of myself being Napoleon can scarcely merely be images of 
the physical figure of Napoleon.... They will rather be images of, for 
instance, the desolation at Austerlitz as viewed by me vaguely aware of 
my short stature and my cockaded hat, my hand in my tunic.' 
At the end of "The Imagination and the Self," Bernard Williams 
uncovers a common confusion about the range of thoughts in 
which the metaphysics of personal identity is implicated. When I 
imagine being someone else, I can be described as imagining that 
I am the other person-which sounds as if I am imagining a re- 
lation of identity between that person and me, David Velleman. As 
Williams points out, however, this particular way of imagining that 
I am another person is not really about me or my identity with 
anyone.2 
Throughout my work on this paper, I have benefited from numerous 
conversations with David Hills. I was also helped by a seminar on meta- 
physics that I taught with Stephen Yablo, and by Steve's comments on 
several drafts of the paper. Others who provided comments and sugges- 
tions include Paul Boghossian, Linda Wimer Brakel, John Broome, Mark 
Crimmins, Neil Delaney, Cody Gilmore, Sally Haslanger, Krista Lawlor, Eric 
Lormand, Thomas Nagel, Lucy O'Brien, Derek Parfit, Jim Pryor, Henry 
Richardson, Amhlie Rorty, Gideon Rosen, Ian Rumfitt, Sydney Shoemaker, 
and Paul Torek. This paper was presented at the 1994 Chapel Hill Collo- 
quium, with Michaelis Michael serving as commentator; and to the Philos- 
ophy Departments of Princeton and Georgetown Universities. It is dedi- 
cated to Claudia Kraus Piper. 
'Bernard Williams, "The Imagination and the Self," in Problems of the 
Self (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 43. 
2Some philosophers have debated whether I can in fact imagine a re- 
lation of identity between Napoleon and David Velleman. Bruce Aune ar- 
gues that I can, provided that I disregard "illusion-shattering facts" about 
Napoleon and me, such as the fact that I am a twentieth-century philoso- 
pher and he a nineteenth-century general ("Speaking of Selves," Philo- 
sophical Quarterly 44 (1994): 290ff.). Zeno Vendler takes the opposite view: 
"In imagining, for instance, being Ronald Reagan, I cannot be imagining 
the identity of Z. V. with R. R., for it is patently impossible for these two 
men to be one and the same, and the patently impossible cannot be imag- 
ined" (The Matter of Minds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon 
Press, 1984), 105). (For an answer to Vendler's argument, seeJohn Mackie, 
"The Transcendental 'I'," in Philosophical Subjects: Essays Presented to P E 
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If my approach to imagining that I am Napoleon, for example, 
is to imagine being Napoleon, then I simply imagine a particular 
situation as experienced by Napoleon. I imagine the landscape at 
Austerlitz as seen through Napoleon's eyes, the sounds of battle as 
heard through his ears, the nap of a tunic as felt by his hand. 
Although Napoleon doesn't appear in the resulting mental image, 
he does appear in the content of my imagining, since I am imag- 
ining Austerlitz specifically as experienced by him. But I, David 
Velleman, am absent both from the image and from the content 
of the imagining: I'm not imagining anything about the person 
who I actually am. 
Since I'm not imagining anything about my actual self, in this 
case, I'm certainly not imagining a relation of identity between me 
and Napoleon. Hence this way of thinking that I am or might be 
a given person doesn't establish the conceivability-much less the 
possibility-of any identities between persons. 
* * * 
Unfortunately, metaphysical discussions of personal identity have 
tended to embrace almost any thoughts about who one is or might 
be, including thoughts similar to the imagining analyzed by Wil- 
liams. For example, when philosophers want to know whether a 
person would survive a surgical rearrangement of his brain, they 
tend to ask whether he would antecedently be in a position to 
Strawson, ed. Zak van Straaten (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon 
Press, 1980), 48-61.) 
As Eric Lormand has pointed out to me, however, there are many ways 
to imagine that I am Napoleon, including not only the method described 
by Williams but also, for example, imagining that Napoleon has been re- 
incarnated as David Velleman, or that he was cryogenically preserved at 
birth, thawed out in 1952, and handed by the maternity nurses to an un- 
suspecting Mrs. Velleman. The latter methods would indeed involve imag- 
ining the supposedly problematic relation of identity. 
The question, then, is not whether I can imagine a relation of identity 
between Napoleon and David Velleman but whether I am necessarily doing 
so when I imagine that I am Napoleon. I interpret Williams as offering a 
negative answer to this question, by describing a way of imagining that I 
am Napoleon without imagining anything about David Velleman at all. For 
a discussion congruent with mine, see Simon Blackburn, "Has Kant Re- 
futed Parfit?" in Reading Parfit, ed. Jonathan Dancy (Oxford: Blackwell, 
forthcoming). 
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anticipate waking up afterwards. The person's anticipation of wak- 
ing up after the operation could of course be described as the 
anticipation that he would survive, in the form of the wakening 
patient. But it might amount to no more than his picturing the 
recovery room as seen through the eyes of the wakening patient; 
and this way of expecting to be that patient is strikingly similar to 
Williams's method for imagining that one is Napoleon.3 
If I can imagine that I am Napoleon without imagining a Na- 
poleonic identity for my actual self, then maybe I can anticipate 
that I will wake up in the future without anticipating a future for 
my actual self, either. Of course, the anticipation that I will wake 
up in the future is a first-personal thought. But so is imagining that 
I am Napoleon; and in that instance, the thought's being first- 
personal doesn't guarantee that it is about me, the thinker. Imag- 
ining that I am Napoleon is first-personal, but it is, so to speak, 
first-personal about Napoleon, in the sense that it is framed from Na- 
poleon's point of view. Perhaps the anticipation that I will wake up 
in the future can be similarly first-personal about a future subject 
who may or may not be identical with me. If so, then students of 
personal identity should probably give up their fascination with 
first-personal anticipation. 
Then again, maybe they should give up their fascination with 
personal identity instead. The appeal of this topic depends largely 
on its promise to address our concern about what we can look 
forward to, or what we can anticipate first-personally. If the mode 
of anticipation that arouses our concern is first-personal in the 
sense of being framed from the perspective of a future person, 
rather than in representing the future existence of the anticipator, 
then that concern should move us to study the psychology of per- 
spectives rather than the metaphysics of persons.4 
3j believe that Williams himself has gone in for this mode of thinking 
about personal identity. See, for example, "The Self and the Future," in 
Problems of the Self 
4At the end of A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality (Indianap- 
olis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978), John Perry has one of the inter- 
locutors conclude, "Perhaps we were wrong, after all, in focusing on iden- 
tity as the necessary condition of anticipation" (49). This possibility is ex- 
plored by Raymond Martin in "Having the Experience: The Next Best 
Thing to Being There," Philosophical Studies 70 (1993): 305-21. It also fig- 
ures prominently in Paul Torek's Something to Look Forward To: Personal Iden- 
tity, Prudence, and Ethics (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1995). The 
present paper is an attempt to find a necessary condition other than iden- 
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* * * 
My aim is to argue for this reinterpretation of our self-regarding 
concern about the future. What matters most, I shall suggest, is 
not whether the person I now regard as self will survive into the 
future; it's whether there will be a future person whom I can now 
regard as self. And whether I can regard a future person as self, I 
shall argue, doesn't necessarily depend on whether he will be the 
same person as me; it depends instead on my access to his point 
of view.5 
My first step will be to review the work of other philosophers on 
first-personal thoughts such as "I am David Velleman" (section 1). 
Drawing on this work, I shall analyze the clause "I am Napoleon" 
as it is used to characterize what I'm imagining in the case de- 
scribed by Williams (section 2). My analysis of this case will lead to 
some further reflections on the nature of first-personal thought 
(section 3); and the resulting account of the first-person will then 
be applied to memories of what I've experienced in the past (sec- 
tion 4) and to anticipations of what I will experience in the future 
tity for the mode of anticipation that arouses our future-directed self-con- 
cern. 
5In arguing that identity is not what matters about our survival, I am of 
course following Derek Parfit (Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford Uni- 
versity Press, Clarendon Press, 1984)). Let me explain briefly how my views 
are related to Parfit's. 
I agree with Parfit that much of our concern about survival is focused 
on our psychological continuity with future persons rather than our meta- 
physical identity with them. But I disagree with Parfit about the kind of 
psychological continuity that matters to us in this regard. As Parfit con- 
ceives it, the relevant continuity comprises not only the psychological con- 
nections forged by memory, for example, but also connections forged by 
the mere persistence of a psychological state or trait (205). I shall argue 
for a narrower conception of the relevant continuity, as comprising only 
those psychological connections that function like memory in giving us 
first-personal access to other points of view. At the end of the paper, I'll 
point out that my conception of psychological continuity yields different 
judgments from Parfit's about various cases in which it's questionable 
whether the subject survives in the sense that matters. 
I think that Parfit himself has reason to prefer my conception of psy- 
chological continuity to his own. For as I shall argue, we report our access 
to other points of view by using the first-person pronoun in ways that would 
naturally cause this continuity to be mistaken for an identity between per- 
sons. My account therefore enables me to explain why that which matters 
in survival might seem to be identity even when it is not. 
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(section 5). Our desire for a future to anticipate, I shall argue, is 
a desire for first-personal access to a future point of view. Why we 
might have this desire is a question that I'll postpone until the 
final section of the paper (section 6). 
1. Who I Am 
The connection between identity and perspective has been ex- 
plored suggestively by Thomas Nagel in his discussions of "the 
objective self."6 One of Nagel's concerns in these discussions is to 
locate the fact of who he is: 
[H]ow can a particular person be me? Given a complete description 
of the world from no particular point of view, including all the people 
in it, one of whom is Thomas Nagel, it seems on the one hand that 
something has been left out, something absolutely essential remains 
to be specified, namely which of them I am. But on the other hand 
there seems no room in the centerless world for such a further fact: 
the world as it is from no point of view seems complete in a way that 
excludes such additions; it is just the world, and everything true of TN 
is already in it. So ... how can it be true of a particular person, a 
particular individual, TN, who is just one of many persons in an ob- 
jectively centerless world, that he is me?7 
Nagel is puzzled here by the fact that he cannot incorporate the 
thought "I am TN" into an objective description of the world. In 
an objective description, this thought would have to appear without 
personal pronouns; but without personal pronouns, the thought 
would simply disappear. So long as Nagel speaks or thinks of TN 
in strictly impersonal terms, he cannot frame the thought that TN 
is him.8 
The impossibility of framing this thought impersonally leads Na- 
6" Subjective and Objective," in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1979); "The Limits of Objectivity," in The Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values, vol. I, ed. S. McMurrin (Salt Lake City: University 
of Utah Press, 1980); "The Objective Self," in Knowledge and Mind, ed. Carl 
Ginet and Sydney Shoemaker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); 
The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 4. 
7The View From Nowhere, 54-55. Note that this is only one of Nagel's 
concerns in his discussions of the "objective self." 
8The classic discussion of this phenomenon isJohn Perry's paper "The 
Problem of the Essential Indexical," Nofts 13 (1979): 3-21. 
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gel to worry that a description of the world must remain incom- 
plete so long as it remains impersonal. This worry is metaphysical, 
in that it envisions things for which "the world" might have 
"room" even though they cannot be described impersonally. In- 
deed, Nagel's worry cannot be understood other than metaphysi- 
cally. Nagel never questions the possibility that an objective descrip- 
tion of the world might be complete in the sense of containing all 
of the objectively statable truths; and its omitting some subjectively 
stated truths could hardly count against its claim to be a complete 
objective description. What Nagel envisions is that a description 
containing all of the objectively statable truths might still be in- 
complete in the sense of failing to describe all of the world, since 
the world might include features that cannot be described objec- 
tively.9 
* * * 
Nagel's reason for thinking that an objective description might be 
incomplete in this sense is that it could never convey the infor- 
mation conveyed in the subjective statement "I am TN." Nagel's 
metaphysical worry therefore rests on an observation about the 
informativeness of an identity statement. And the informativeness 
of identity statements has been studied extensively by philosophers 
of language since Frege, including some who have focused es- 
pecially on identity statements involving the first-person.10 
What the work of these philosophers suggests, however, is that 
9The belief in a subjective feature of the world constituting who I am is 
like the belief in a tensed feature constituting when now is. The analogy 
has been drawn explicitly by D. H. Mellor in "I and Now," Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society 89 (1988): 79-94. For an author who believes in such 
features of the world, see Geoffrey Madell, "Personal Identity and the Idea 
of a Human Being," in Human Beings, ed. David Cockburn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
10 shall be drawing especially on John Perry's "Problem of the Essential 
Indexical" and his "Self-Notions," Logos: Philosophic Issues in Christian Per- 
spective 11 (1990): 17-31. (Both papers have been reprinted in The Problem 
of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993).) See also Stephen E. Boer and William G. Lycan, Knowing Who 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), chap. 6; and Lycan, Consciousness (Cam- 
bridge: MIT Press, 1987), 80. The general account of identity statements 
on which I rely is similar to that offered by P.F. Strawson in Subject and 
Predicate in Logic and Grammar (London: Methuen, 1974), 51-56. 
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"I am TN" can be informative for Nagel without describing any 
objectively indescribable feature of the world, and hence that its 
informativeness shouldn't lead to any metaphysical worries. Let me 
summarize this work briefly, with the help of David Lewis's sugges- 
tion that self-locating thoughts like "I am TN" resemble the car- 
tographic legend "This map is here."11 
* * * 
Suppose that you visit the battlefield at Austerlitz and find, at the 
former site of Napoleon's headquarters, a map that bears the leg- 
end "This map is here," followed by an arrow pointing to a rect- 
angle in the map's lower left corner. This legend is certainly in- 
formative, but what information does it give you? 
The informativeness of the legend depends on the fact that its 
two indexical terms, "this" and "here," pick out their referents in 
two different ways. The word "here" is assigned a referent by the 
arrow that connects it to a rectangle on the map. The word doesn't 
refer to the rectangle itself, of course; if it did, the legend would 
make the absurd assertion that the map occupies a small rectangle 
in its own lower left corner. The word "here" refers instead to the 
region of the battlefield that's represented by the rectangle, that 
being where the map is actually located. 
The map could refer to this region as "here" without the help 
of an arrow. For example, it might also bear the words "This map 
was placed here by the Austerlitz Tourist Board." In this inscrip- 
tion, the word "here" would refer directly to the general vicinity 
of the inscription itself, and so no arrow would be needed to com- 
plete the reference. In "This map was placed here by the Austerlitz 
Tourist Board," however, the word "here" would roughly mean 
"where you now see it, before your eyes." And the legend "This 
map is here" doesn't refer to the relevant region as "here" in the 
same sense. If the legend "This map is here" were displayed with 
no arrow, and you had to interpret "here" as meaning "here be- 
"Attitudes De Dicto and De Se," Philosophical Review 88 (1979): 513-14, 
528. The moral that I draw from this analogy is similar to one drawn from 
Kant's Paralogisms of Pure Reason, to the effect that "in identifying 'my- 
self I am identifying no more than a point of view upon the world, and 
not an entity within it" (Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of 
the Erotic (New York: Free Press, 1986), 114). 
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fore your eyes," then the legend would give you no new informa- 
tion. You already know that the map is here before your eyes; what 
you want to know is where that location lies in the representational 
scheme of the map. Hence the need for the arrow, which secures 
reference to the map's actual location via the map's representation 
of it. 
Unlike the word "here," the phrase "this map" does pick out 
its referent as an object before your eyes. If "this map" referred 
to the map indirectly, via its representation in the map, then the 
legend would once again become uninformative. Imagine a second 
arrow, leading from the phrase "this map" to the same rectangle 
that's indicated by the arrow leading from "here." This second 
arrow would reduce the map's legend to the trivial statement that 
a map located in the region represented by the rectangle is indeed 
located in the region represented by the rectangle. 
The legend on the actual map is informative because it refers to 
the same location in two different ways-once as the location of 
"this map [before your eyes]" and once as the location that's 
"here [according to the map]." The legend tells you where the 
map that you are seeing can be found on the battlefield as seen 
by the map. 
* * * 
The reason for referring to the same location twice, as seen by you 
and by the map, is to help you align the map with your self-cen- 
tered conception of your surroundings. For until you work out this 
alignment, you can't use the map to find your way around the 
battlefield. 
In touring the battlefield, you will have to be guided by your 
senses, which give you a representation of the field from your own 
point of view. Unfortunately, this self-centered representation of 
your surroundings is incomplete, in that it includes only what you 
can perceive or remember perceiving. You want to expand it to 
include regions that you haven't perceived, so that it represents 
what is over the hillock on your left or behind the trees up ahead. 
These regions are represented in the map, of course, but not from 
the perspective of the perceptual representation by which you must 
navigate. You therefore need to transfer information from the 
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map's complete, centerless representation of the battlefield to your 
incomplete, self-centered representation. 
In order to transfer information between these representations, 
you have to know which parts of them are co-referential-which 
marks on the map refer to which landmarks within your perceptual 
field. The legend "This map is here" enables you to coordinate 
these schemes of reference, by showing how both schemes pick 
out a single landmark, the map itself.'2 
* * * 
The informativeness of "This map is here" is thus potentially mis- 
leading. "This map is here" adds to your knowledge of the battle- 
field, but not by giving you knowledge about additional features of 
the battlefield-features that aren't described in the representa- 
tions that you already have. 
All that the legend reports is the map's location, which is already 
reported twice in your existing representations of the battlefield, 
once in the map itself and again in your self-centered conception. 
Hence the legend doesn't inform you by revealing some aspect of 
the battlefield that's left out of these representations; rather, it in- 
forms you by conveying a rule of translation between these rep- 
resentations, thus enabling you to make better use of the infor- 
mation they already contain. And the legend conveys this rule of 
translation by demonstrating it, not by stating it. It shows you how 
to translate between these schemes of representation, by using 
both of them to specify the map's location. 
Many different statements could provide this demonstration. 
What's conveyed by the legend "This map is here" could equally 
well be conveyed by a different statement, such as "The hillock on 
your left is here" or "The trees up ahead are here" or-as maps 
often say-"You are here." All the legend needs to do is identify 
some location or other within both representational schemes, thus 
demonstrating how to translate between them. 
'2Gareth Evans took this point further, by suggesting that nothing could 
count as one's objective conception of the world unless one grasped the 
possibility of correlating it with one's self-centered conception (The Varieties 
of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 212). 
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In showing you how to translate between schemes of representa- 
tion, the legend offers practical guidance, which you must follow 
within the self-centered perspective that you occupy as an agent. 
That's why the legend refers indexically to "this map" and literally 
points to a region within it, picking out both items as they appear 
in your visual field. A legend that spoke impersonally about how 
to transfer information between such-and-such a map and so-and- 
so's visual field would not be helpful-not, that is, unless you could 
translate it into your personal terms, such as "this map" and 
"here." For if you are to follow the rule for translating between 
the perspectives at hand, that rule must be framed from your own 
perspective, as it is by the legend "This map is here." 
Nagel's thought "I am TN" is informative in the same way: it 
demonstrates, within his conception of the world as centered on 
"me," how to correlate that conception with a centerless concep- 
tion of the world, as containing someone named "TN."'13 "I am 
TN" is informative, then, because it shows how to transfer infor- 
mation between these two conceptions of the world, not because 
it describes some feature of the world that they have omitted.'4 
2. Who I Might Be 
This account of Nagel's self-locating thought helps us to under- 
stand cases of projective imagination as well. My being Napoleon 
is not a feature of the world that's depicted in the mental image 
by which I imagine that I am Napoleon; it's rather a rule for trans- 
lating between that image and an objective description of what it 
depicts. The image represents that I am Napoleon in the sense 
13Here I am considering, with Nagel, why this statement would consti- 
tute an informative addition to a complete objective description of the 
world. Of course, if Nagel's objective conception of the world is incom- 
plete, then "I am TN" may be informative in other ways as well. 
14Nagel explains that "I am TN" is informative because it reports "the 
fact that this impersonal conception of the world, though it accords no 
special position to TN, is attached to and developed from the perspective 
of TN" (The View From Nowhere, 64). For a critique of Nagel's explanation, 
see Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and their 
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1983), 168- 
69. A different explanation is offered by Zeno Vendler in chapter 6 of The 
Matter of Minds. 
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that it is framed in a self-centered scheme of reference that's cen- 
tered on NB. 
When I speak of a scheme of reference that's centered on NB, 
I don't just mean, for example, an image of Austerlitz as it looked 
from a place where NB stood.15 Entertaining such an image might 
amount to no more than visualizing Austerlitz as it looked to NB, 
which is not the same as imagining that I am NB seeing it. An 
account of imagined seeing must distinguish it from the less am- 
bitious project of mere visualization.16 Both imaginative projects 
involve a mental image drawn from NB's perspective. The differ- 
ence is that only imagined seeing involves, in addition, the thought 
of that perspective as occupied-and, indeed, as occupied by NB.17 
A visual image has a perspective because objects are represented 
in it by regions whose size and placement depend on the angles 
subtended by those objects at some common point in space. The 
representational scheme of the image is governed by lines of sight 
converging at a single vantage point, whose location the image 
suggests but doesn't depict. 
In ordinary vision, this vantage point is occupied by the eyes of 
the person experiencing the visual image, and the image is pre- 
sented as the immediate product of this sensory encounter with 
the depicted scene.18 Thus, the image has a centered scheme of ref- 
erence because it represents objects as they are intercepted by lines 
of sight that converge at a single point; and it has a self-centered 
15For the sake of simplicity, I am going to confine my attention to the 
visual image involved in my imagining. Some aspects of visual imagery- 
for example, its perspectival geometry-are better understood than the 
corresponding aspects (if any) of tactual, auditory, olfactory, or kinesthetic 
imagery. 
%This problem is the one that Williams considers in "Imagination and 
the Self" The solution I offer here is largely his. 
17Wollheim distinguishes these modes of imagination as "acentral" and 
"central" ("Imagination and Identification," in On Art and the Mind (Cam- 
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), 54-83). Williams distinguished 
them by calling the latter "participatory imagery." 
18j am being deliberately vague in speaking of how an image is "pre- 
sented." The "presentation" of the image may consist in a preceding or 
accompanying thought about the image; or in some distinctive phenome- 
nal qualities of the image itself, combined perhaps with beliefs or cognitive 
dispositions of the subject with respect to such qualities. I hope to remain 
neutral among these possibilities. 
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scheme of reference because the point of convergence is thought 
of as occupied by the image's subject. 
Yet the imagination can frame a visual image without the 
thought that its vantage point is occupied. The result in that case 
is visualization rather than imagined seeing. The image represents 
objects as they would appear to a viewer, if one were present, but 
it doesn't represent them as so appearing to anyone. 
Going beyond mere visualization to imagined seeing entails con- 
juring up, not just a visual image, but also the thought of such an 
image as being experienced by someone occupying its vantage 
point and confronting the objects it depicts. Imaginary seeing thus 
requires an imagined viewer, who is imagined simultaneously as 
the mind containing the image, so to speak, and as an unseen 
object located where its lines of sight converge. This viewer is pos- 
ited by the imagination, but he is not pictured: he is simply thought 
of, as providing the mental environs of the image and the senso- 
rium at its spatial and causal point of origin.19 
When I think of the image as having a subject, it becomes a way 
of thinking about that person reflexively, as "self." And to think 
of a person reflexively, as "self," is also to think of him as "me." 
If I think of the image as having a particular subject, such as Na- 
poleon, the image becomes a way of thinking about Napoleon as 
"me," and so it becomes a way of thinking that I am Napoleon. 
* * * 
Let me elaborate for a moment on this notion of a visual image as 
a way of thinking about someone else as "me." Elaboration is need- 
ed because a visual image rarely contains uses of the first-person 
pronoun: it isn't a way of thinking about the imagined viewer as 
"me" in so many words, or in any words at all. 
In a case of imagined seeing, however, the image is framed to 
depict things as seen by someone, who is thus introduced in 
19The relation between the subject's role as the bearer of consciousness 
and his role as owner of the operative sensorium is discussed by Sydney 
Shoemaker, "Embodiment and Behavior," in The Identities of Persons, ed. 
Amelie Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 109-37. It is 
also the implicit topic of Daniel Dennett's "Where Am I?" in Brainstorms; 
Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), 
310-23. Both papers point out that these roles can come apart. 
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thought as the subject of the image. The image still doesn't present 
this viewer as one of the objects visible in it; but it does present 
the viewer invisibly, insofar as it now depicts things as seen by him; 
and it thereby presents him reflexively, as the subject, in the way 
that a spoken first-person pronoun presents its speaker.20 
Although the reflexivity of a mental image doesn't consist in a 
use of the first-person pronoun, it would occasion a use of the 
pronoun in the corresponding verbal report. A report of what I'm 
imagining would of course describe the objects depicted in the 
image-the field, the smoke of battle, and so on. Yet it would also 
have to make clear that these objects were being imagined, not 
merely as they would appear if someone saw them, but as being 
seen. How could a verbal report make clear that it was conveying 
the contents of an imagined seeing? The obvious way would be to 
include a prefatory "I see," in which "I" would refer to the person 
who does the seeing; and the person who does the seeing, in this 
context, is the imagined viewer. The verbal expression of an imag- 
ined seeing thus confirms that its scheme of representation casts 
the imagined viewer in the role of first person, as the referent of 
"me." 
* * * 
But who would be speaking here? Whose image is being put into 
words? 
I have thus far neglected to distinguish between the image that's 
in the mind of the imaginer and the one that's in the mind of the 
20Throughout the paper I assume that "first-personal" thought is not 
necessarily personal, in that it need not involve the concept of a person. 
Creatures who lack the concept of a person can nevertheless manifest be- 
havior that is to be explained by their having egocentric representations 
of their surroundings-representations whose content cannot be expressed 
without the help of first-person pronouns. We cannot explain the stalking 
behavior of a cat, for example, except in terms of perceptions expressible 
as "There's a mouse in front of me," "I'm close enough to pounce on it," 
and so on. Yet the attribution of such first-personal thoughts to the cat 
does not imply that it thinks of itself, or of anything else, as a person. Here 
I am in pointed disagreement with John Campbell, who thinks that even 
proprioceptions such as "I am about to fall over" are essentially about a 
person ("The Reductionist View of the Self," in Reduction, Explanation, and 
Realism, ed. David Charles and Kathleen Lennon (Oxford: Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, Clarendon Press, 1992), 392ff.). 
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imagined viewer. When I imagine that I am Napoleon viewing Aus- 
terlitz, I don't imagine, of the faint and incomplete image in my 
own mind, that this very image belongs to a visual experience in 
the mind of NB.21 Rather, my image is a medium for imagining 
NB's visual experience. 
The sense in which I imagine NB's visual experience is not that 
I conjure up an image in which NB's experience is one of the 
objects depicted.22 It's rather that I conjure up an image that pur- 
ports to be a secondary version of NB's-a duplicate of his visual 
impression, or a prototype for it. And the image regarded as having 
NB for its subject would seem to be the primary or original image 
in NB's mind, not the secondary version of it in mine. The ques- 
tion therefore arises whether my image still qualifies as a way of 
thinking about NB as "me." 
By and large, secondary versions of an image share its referential 
scheme. A reproduction of a picture of Austerlitz is itself an image 
of Austerlitz; an artist's design for a mural of Austerlitz is an image 
of Austerlitz, too. Both are copies-one modeled after the primary 
image, the other serving as a model for it-and both share the 
referential scheme of the picture to which they stand as copies.23 
Similarly, the image in my mind, regarded as a copy of NB's visual 
impression, is an image of whatever NB is supposed to be seeing. 
But what about reflexive or first-personal reference? In the ref- 
erential scheme of NB's visual impression, NB occupies first-person 
position, since he is the subject. Yet the copy occurs in my mind, 
where I am the subject. So shouldn't I, DV, be the person who is 
reflexively presented in this image? 
21Here I disagree with John Mackie's suggestion that the imagined sub- 
ject is imagined to be "the subject of my present experiences" ("The Tran- 
scendental 'I'," 56). 
221f an image depicting Napoleon's visual experience were an imagined 
seeing rather than a mere visualization, it would be a way of imagining, 
not that I am Napoleon, but that I am someone who can peer into Na- 
poleon's mind. 
231n speaking of mental images as "copies," I do not mean to imply 
anything about their degree of resolution, detail, or faithfulness to the 
original. I am also attempting to remain neutral on the direction of fit 
between these copies and their originals. 
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There isn't a simple answer to this question. A mental copy of a 
visual impression can have two subjects. The person entertaining 
a secondary image is certainly the subject of that image. But insofar 
as the image is regarded as a copy of a primary impression, it 
resembles that impression not merely in depicting the objects seen 
but also in depicting those objects as seen by the primary viewer. Al- 
lusion to the primary viewer is essential to the representational 
scheme of the secondary image, and he is alluded to specifically 
as the subject, since objects are represented specifically as seen by 
him. 
Considerations such as these have led some philosophers to 
speak of secondary images as having an "internal" subject in ad- 
dition to any "external" subject they might have.24 I find the terms 
"internal" and "external" uninformative, however, and so I will 
speak instead of the notional and actual subjects. The notional 
subject of a secondary image is the person thought of as occupying 
the image's vantage point and undergoing the visual impression of 
which the image is a copy. 
In the representational scheme of such an image, the notional 
subject tends to crowd out the actual subject as the target of re- 
flexive reference. The notional subject has to get into the act some- 
how, or the image won't amount to a representation of things as 
seen by him. And he can't get into the act, in his capacity as the 
viewer, just by getting into the image; for as the viewer, he occupies 
a role over and above that of anything viewed. He therefore gets 
into the act by being thought of as the subject, as the person re- 
flexively presented by the image, and hence as the target of self- 
reference within the visual scheme of representation. 
* * * 
Consider again how the referential scheme of my mental image 
24The term "internal subject" was coined, I believe, by Richard Wol- 
lheim. Wollheim's clearest discussion of the issue is in lecture 3 of Painting 
as an Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). In the case of paint- 
ings, of course, there is no external subject, since the secondary image is 
on canvas rather than in a person's mind. See also Wollheim's "Imagina- 
tion and Identification." For a recent discussion of the issue in application 
to perceptual experience, see Bill Brewer, "Self-Location and Agency," 
Mind 101 (1992): 17-34. 
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would be expressed in words. To ask whom the image presents in 
the position of subject or self is to ask how the image's self-centered 
scheme of reference is oriented in the objective world.25 And as 
we have seen, an image's orientation can be demonstrated within 
its scheme of reference by an identity statement of the form "I am 
so-and-so." 
If such a statement were framed within my image's scheme of 
reference, it would be framed from the point of view embodied in 
the image, which is that of the imagined viewer. And a statement 
framed from the viewer's point of view would be a statement made 
by the viewer-who has to be Napoleon if my image is to represent 
things as seen by him. The identity statement that would demon- 
strate the referential orientation of my image is therefore the state- 
ment that would be made by NB: "I am Napoleon." 
In his capacity as the viewer, of course, NB is merely imaginary, 
and his statement would be imaginary, too. But it would be easy 
enough to imagine. In fact, I may already be putting imaginary 
words into the mouth of NB, if my imagining includes what Wil- 
liams calls a "narration":26 
Consider now the narration.... It is going to be of the general form: 
'I have conquered; the ideals of the Revolution in my hands are sweep- 
ing away the old world. Poor Maria Walewska, I wonder where she is 
now' and so on and so on, according to whatever knowledge or illu- 
sions I possess about Napoleon. 
When I imagine saying "I have conquered," I conjure up an 
image of this utterance from the speaker's point of view, and I 
superimpose this point of view on that embodied in the imagined 
visual impression, in such a way that both are centered on NB as 
the notional subject of speech and vision together. If I replaced "I 
have conquered" with "I am Napoleon" (or perhaps "I, Napoleon, 
have conquered"), I would thereby give myself a demonstration, 
within the referential scheme of my imagining, of how that scheme 
is coordinated with an objective description of the world. 
To imagine saying "I am Napoleon" would therefore be a way 
25The objective world involved here is the imaginary world, objectively 
described. After all, I can imagine that I am Napoleon at the battle of 
Narnia rather than Austerlitz. 
26"Imagination and the Self," 43. 
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for me to spell out for myself that I'm imagining everything as 
seen (and said) by NB.27 I could even use this statement to spell 
out for others what I'm imagining, provided that I enclosed it in 
quotation marks to indicate that it was couched in the terms of the 
imagining. For I could say this: I am imagining, "I am Napoleon." 
My report of imagining that I am Napoleon simply transposes this 
quoted identity statement into indirect discourse. In doing so, it 
replaces the pronoun "I" with what Castafieda called a quasi-in- 
dicator.28 
A quasi-indicator is an indexical used in oratio obliqua to mark 
the position that would be occupied in oratio recta by a reflexive 
term such as "me." John Perry has analyzed the workings of quasi- 
indicators as follows:29 
I think that when we use quasi-indicators we combine a remark about 
what [someone] believes with a remark, or a hint, about how he be- 
lieves it. In the case of "he," the second bit of information is roughly 
that he believes what he believes in virtue of accepting a sentence with 
"I" in it. That is, "Smith believes that he is o" tells us that Smith 
believes Smith to be (x in virtue of accepting "I am (x." More precisely, 
it tells us that he [believes] it in virtue of being in a certain belief 
state, which in English-speaking adults typically results in the utter- 
ance, in appropriate circumstances, of "I am (x." 
Suppose that Smith overhears a conversation in which some un- 
named person is confidently said to be a. Smith may come to be- 
27The imagined statement itself is not what gives my imagining the con- 
tent that I am Napoleon. For I can imagine saying "I am Napoleon" with- 
out imagining that I am Napoleon-for example, in the course of imag- 
ining that I am someone with Napoleonic delusions. To imagine that I am 
Napoleon is to imagine that which this imagined statement would ex- 
press-namely, Napoleon's occupying the center of a self-centered scheme 
of reference. 
28See "Indicators and Quasi-Indicators," American Philosophical Quarterly 
4 (1967): 203-10. A discussion of the literature on this subject can be 
found in John Perry's "Castafieda on He and I," in The Problem of the 
Esssential Indexical. 
29"Belief and Acceptance," in The Problem of the Essential Indexical, 60. 
Note that Perry's account is different from Castafieda's. 
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lieve, of that unnamed person, that he is a. Now suppose that the 
person under discussion is in fact Smith. Smith has then come to 
believe Smith to be a. But Smith may or may not be aware of being 
the person in question, and so in believing Smith to be a, he may 
believe it in one of two ways, which Perry analyzes as follows. He 
may believe it either by accepting a sentence of the form "He is 
a" or by accepting the sentence "I am a," depending on which 
sentence would typically be uttered by an English speaker in his 
state of mind. 
When we say "Smith believes that he is a," we normally mean 
that Smith holds his belief in the latter, first-personal way: our re- 
port would be misleading if Smith were unaware of being the per- 
son in question. According to Perry, then, we mean not only that 
Smith believes Smith to be a but also that he believes it in virtue 
of accepting the sentence "I am a"-that is, in virtue of occupying 
a state that typically results in an utterance of this first-personal 
sentence. We thus use "he" as a quasi-indicator, marking the pres- 
ence of a first-person pronoun in the sentence whose utterance 
would typically express Smith's belief. 
As it stands, Perry's analysis applies only to beliefs: it cannot 
cover cases of imagining, because imaginings don't typically give 
rise to utterances. But the materials for extending the analysis are 
already at hand. For when Smith imagines that he is Napoleon, we 
have found, he may do so by conjuring up secondary images with 
NB as their notional subject, thereby entering a state of imagina- 
tion whose referential orientation would be spelled out by a further 
image, of the utterance "I am Napoleon." Just as there is an actual 
utterance by which the believer would typically express what he 
believes, so there is an utterance-image by which the imaginer 
would typically express what he imagines. So Perry's analysis can 
be extended from beliefs to imaginings if the utterances expressive 
of beliefs are replaced in the analysis by the utterance-images ex- 
pressive of imaginings. 
This extension of Perry's analysis crucially affects the role of the 
quasi-indicator. In "Smith believes that he is Napoleon," the quasi- 
indicator "he" marks the place of the first-person pronoun in "I 
am Napoleon" as it might actually be said by Smith. The quasi- 
indicator thus stands in for a pronoun referring to Smith. But in 
"Smith imagines that he is Napoleon," the quasi-indicator marks 
the place of the first-person pronoun in "I am Napoleon" as it 
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might be imagined by Smith but as said in this imagining by Na- 
poleon. And in "I am Napoleon" as said by NB, "I" would refer 
to NB. 
Thus, the "he" in "Smith imagines that he is Napoleon" echoes 
an imagined use of "I" that would refer to Napoleon and not to 
Smith. So it does not pick out Smith as the object of Smith's im- 
aginings; it merely introduces the self-concept, or "I," under which 
Smith imagines Napoleon, as he would express by going on to 
imagine saying, "I am Napoleon." The same goes for the second 
occurrence of "I" in "I'm imagining that I am Napoleon." This 
"I" isn't a reference to me, David Velleman. It simply marks the 
place of the first-person pronoun in the utterance-image "I am 
Napoleon," which would demonstrate the orientation of my imag- 
ining from within. 
Here at last we see why Williams's method for imagining that I 
am Napoleon does not involve imagining anything about my actual 
self, DV. It simply involves entertaining imaginary thoughts in the 
Napoleonic first-person, so to speak, an egocentric scheme of ref- 
erence whose center-and hence whose ego-is NB. 
3. What "I" Is 
But how can I think about Napoleon in the first-person? The first- 
person is a reflexive mode of thought, and I am in no position to 
think about NB reflexively, since reflexive thoughts are about their 
own thinker, and I, the thinker, am not NB. 
I am happy to grant that my thoughts in this case are not re- 
flexive in the objective sense of referring to the person who is in 
fact thinking them. But as Perry's analysis illustrates, philosophers 
have recognized a distinction between a thought's being objectively 
reflexive in this sense and its being subjectively reflexive, by pre- 
senting the thinker in the distinctively first-personal way, under the 
guise of self.30 Although my thoughts about NB aren't about their 
own thinker, they do present NB in first-personal guise. 
30This recognition can perhaps be traced to Elizabeth Anscombe's pa- 
per "The First Person," in which Anscombe invented a mode of reference 
that was objectively but not subjectively reflexive. The paper is reprinted 
in Anscombe's Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind; Collected Papers (Ox- 
ford: Blackwell, 1981), 21-36. 
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* * * 
I now seem to be suggesting that some modes of thought may be 
subjectively but not objectively reflexive, presenting first-personally 
someone who is not the person thinking them. This suggestion 
would be problematic, to say the least. 
Even those philosophers who recognize the distinction between 
subjective and objective reflexivity assume that a subjectively re- 
flexive mode of thought-though individuated, perhaps, by its sub- 
jective character-must nevertheless be guaranteed to refer to the 
thinker in fact.31 Otherwise, I could think about someone first- 
personally and yet be uncertain of his relation to the thinker of 
this thought. I would then be in a position to doubt whether "I" 
exist, since the doubt itself would guarantee only the existence of 
the doubter, who might not be the person whose existence was 
being doubted, however first-personally. 
Fortunately, I needn't go so far as to suggest a gap between sub- 
jective and objective reflexivity. My point all along has been that 
secondary mental images have two subjects, one actual and one 
notional. The possibility of thoughts with notional as well as actual 
subjects requires us to enlarge our understanding of what it is for 
a thought to be reflexive. 
The distinction between actual and notional subjects already fig- 
ures in the subjective character of secondary images. Even to the 
imaginer himself, the image presents an imagining subject and a 
viewing subject, both in ways that are recognizably subject-present- 
ing, and hence first-personal. So even within the category of sub- 
jective reflexivity, we must distinguish between actual and notional 
reflexivity, tomark the difference between the ways in which some- 
one can be presented as the subject of thought. 
We can then say that my mental image of Austerlitz, in its sub- 
jective character, is a notionally reflexive thought about Napoleon: 
I am thinking about NB in the notional first-person. And the no- 
tional first-person eedn't refer to the actual subject of thought. 
311 think that this assumption is operative, for example, in John Camp- 
bell's discussion of "Self-Reference and Self-Knowledge," in Past, Space, and 
Self (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), chap. 4; and in Lucy F. O'Brien, "An- 
scombe and the Self-Reference Rule," Analysis 54 (1994): 277-81. 
58 
SELF TO SELF 
* * * 
To claim that I can think of Napoleon in the notional first-person 
is still to claim too much, however. The notional reflexivity of my 
thoughts about Napoleon is less than genuine. 
In order to imagine that I am Napoleon, I frame an image of 
Austerlitz as seen by someone who might thereby be moved to say 
"I see ... ," and then I stipulate that the image and the associated 
utterance are oriented in such a way that "I" refers to NB. Without 
this referential stipulation, my mental image would not be a way 
of thinking about Napoleon as "me," and so it wouldn't be a way 
of imagining that I am Napoleon. Yet stipulations of this sort are 
foreign to reflexive usage. I don't usually specify to whom my uses 
of "me" refer-not even uses of the notional "me." 
Suppose, for example, that I have a visual memory of a desolate 
field just like the one surveyed by Napoleon at Austerlitz. This 
memory includes a visual image that's presented as reprising an 
earlier visual experience, whose subject stood at the image's van- 
tage point in front of the remembered scene. The memory image 
is thus presented as a duplicate, representing the field as seen by 
an original subject on some date in the past. It therefore has a 
notional subject, who would be the referent of the first-person pro- 
noun in an accompanying image of the utterance "I see ... ." if 
such an utterance were remembered from the same point of view. 
If the image is indeed a copy of a visual impression, as it purports 
to be, then there is already a fact of the matter as to the identity 
of its notional subject: he is the person from whose experience the 
image was copied.32 The image's notional reflexivity with respect 
to that person is not the product of any semantic stipulation on 
my part. I do not center the memory image on someone in the 
past so as to make him the notional subject. The image is just 
presented to me as having been copied from a visual impression, 
and it consequently represents things as seen by the subject of the 
321 do not mean to imply that the original viewer is the notional subject 
of the image solely because of its psychological origins in his experience. 
If the image wasn't presented in thought as the copy of a visual impression, 
then it might not present anyone as the notional subject, even if it was in 
fact copied from someone's experience. Because the image is presented 
as a copy, however, it has a notional subject, whose identity is then deter- 
mined by his being the subject of the original. See also note 45, below. 
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impression from which it was, in fact, copied. Who he was is then 
determined by the image's causal history. 
* * * 
The reflexivity of my memory is therefore genuine in a way that 
the reflexivity of imaginings is not. In memory I really think of the 
notional subject as "me"; in imagination, I only pretend to. 
What makes a thought subjectively reflexive, after all, is that it is 
indexical in a special way: it has a peculiar way of pointing. A re- 
flexive thought picks out a person at its center by mentally pointing 
to him in a distinctively inward-directed fashion. My experiential 
memories pick out past subjects by pointing to them in this way, 
but my imaginings cannot really do the same with Napoleon. 
Before I can frame an image that points to Napoleon at its cen- 
ter-even its notional center-I must first frame another thought 
that picks him out, so that I can center the image on him. When 
I subsequently use that image to think of him at its center, I can 
only pretend to be using a mode of thought that's sufficient to 
pick him out. In fact, I couldn't have picked out NB as "me" with- 
out first picking him out as "Napoleon," in order to stipulate that 
he was the notional subject of thought. 
Hence the thought of NB as "me" is less than genuinely reflex- 
ive. Genuinely reflexive thoughts don't rely on an antecedent spec- 
ification of their target: they just point to the subject, at the center 
of thought. They are-to put it somewhat paradoxically-unself- 
conscious about their reference, in that they require no other 
thought about whom they refer to. I can think of NB as notionally 
"me" only by deliberately placing him where he will intercept this 
inward-directed pointer, thus rendering its reference to him self- 
conscious. So I can only pretend to think of him in the notional 
first-person.33 
33Note that the same considerations may apply to cases in which I imag- 
ine that I am David Velleman. For example, if I re-center my image of 
Austerlitz so as to imagine that I, David Velleman, am fighting in Napo- 
leon's place, my thoughts do not become genuinely first-personal simply 
because they are now about DV rather than NB. I am still stipulating who 
is the notional "me," and hence only pretending to pick him out just by 
pointing. 
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4. Who I Was 
But what if I believe that my memory is a vestige of Napoleon's 
experiences at the battle of Austerlitz rather than of any experi- 
ences of my own?34 In that case, I will believe it to be an image of 
Austerlitz as seen by Napoleon, on whom the image is centered 
naturally, without any stipulation on my part. And I will believe 
that it has a content that would be expressed by an accompanying 
memory of the utterance "I see Austerlitz," as spoken-and spo- 
ken truly-by a real person seeing Austerlitz. I may then transpose 
this utterance into indirect discourse by claiming to remember that 
I saw the battle of Austerlitz.35 
This report would be odd because the verb "to remember" is 
34Gareth Evans argued that one could not question whether apparent 
memories derived from one's own experiences (Varieties of Reference, 235- 
48). According to Evans, one cannot even have a self-concept unless orne 
is disposed to assimilate the information in memories and perceptions in 
ways that already constitute taking oneself as their source. A subject who 
didn't already treat himself as the source of memories, Evans argued, 
couldn't go on to doubt whether he was the source, since he would lack 
a concept needed for framing this doubt. 
Note, however, that Evans's argument yields no conclusions about ap- 
parent memories taken singly. What the argument shows, if anything, is 
that I could not question whether I was the source of my recovered images 
in general. If I treat recovered images in general as derived from own 
experiences, however, then even by Evans's lights I will have the self-con- 
cept with which to doubt, about any particular image, whether I was its 
source. Hence Evans's argument does not preclude the possibility of my 
thinking that I have particular images recovered from Napoleon's experi- 
ences rather than my own. (Other potential obstacles to my taking this 
view are discussed in the following note.) 
350f course, I will also think that the image's content would be ex- 
pressed by an accompanying memory of the utterance "I, Napoleon, see 
Austerlitz." Will I consequently claim to remember that I, Napoleon, saw 
Austerlitz? 
Compare Andy Hamilton's remarks on the difficulty of reporting an 
apparent memory derived from Derek Parfit's experience of arriving at 
Bournemouth station: 
One could try 'I remember arriving at Bournemouth station-only the "I" 
then was Parfit!'. (It was the same 'I', only the person had changed his iden- 
tity.) Or 'I remember arriving at Bournemouth, only it was not my body that 
arrived'. But these are desperate expedients. ("A New Look at Personal Iden- 
tity," The Philosophical Quarterly 45: (1995), 342) 
These are indeed desperate expedients, but only because they rely on an 
61 
J DAVID VELLEMAN 
factive: the claim to remember something implies that it's true. If 
I speak the truth in claiming to remember that I saw Austerlitz, 
then what I claim to remember must be true as well; and what I 
claim to remember would seem to be that I saw Austerlitz. The 
merely bizarre belief that I have inherited one of NB's visual im- 
ages seems to yield the truly absurd conclusion that I underwent 
one of his visual experiences. 
* * * 
One way to avoid such absurdities would be to qualify the descrip- 
tion of my mental image. If I called it something other than a 
memory-say, an apparent memory or a quasi-memory36-then I 
wouldn't imply that it was veridical. 
Yet my claim to remember that I saw Austerlitz wouldn't lead to 
absurd conclusions if it were properly understood. In saying "I 
remember that I saw Austerlitz," I am indeed claiming to occupy 
a mental state whose content is true. But I am not attributing to 
that state the content that would be conveyed by my saying "I saw 
Austerlitz" in oratio recta, where "I" would refer to the speaker, DV. 
Rather, I'm attributing to it the content that would be conveyed 
by an accompanying image of the utterance "I see Austerlitz," 
where "I" would refer to the original viewer. So I'm not reporting 
that I, DV, witnessed the battle of Austerlitz; I'm merely reporting 
memories of Austerlitz in which a witness of it is the notional 
"me."37 
exchange of bodies or identities, which is quite unnecessary. What the 
subject of this transplanted memory should say is "I remember that I was 
Derek Parfit arriving at Bournemouth." This claim says nothing about an 
exchange between Parfit and the remembering subject, because-as I shall 
argue in the text-the second "I" is, not a reference to the rememberer, 
but a quasi-indicator echoing the first-personal conception under which 
Parfit's arrival at Bournemouth is being remembered. Similarly, my belief 
in having inherited Napoleon's visual image of Austerlitz should lead me 
to say, "I remember that I was Napoleon viewing the battle of Austerlitz." 
36For the term "quasi-memory," see Sydney Shoemaker, "Persons and 
Their Pasts," American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970): 269-85. Actually, the 
mental states I am discussing would be called quasi,-memories by Shoe- 
maker, because they are, as I put it, "recovered from" -and hence appro- 
priately caused by-the original experiences. 
37Thus, in "I remember that I saw Austerlitz," the second "I" is a quasi- 
indicator, which Castafieda would write with an asterisk, thus: "I remember 
that I* saw Austerlitz." So formulated, this statement begins to look like 
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My mental image is indeed notionally reflexive with respect to 
such a person, if (as I believe) it was inherited from Napoleon. For 
in that case, the referential scheme of the image is not dependent 
on any prior specification of NB as the notional subject. Napoleon 
is the notional subject of my image because it is presented to me 
as derived from the visual experience of an original viewer, and 
that viewer was (so I believe) NB. His being the notional subject 
of the image is thus a matter of historical fact rather than stipu- 
lation; and so the image picks him out as "me" unselfconsciously, 
just by pointing to him in the center of its referential scheme. 
Thus, if my mental image was inherited from Napoleon, then it 
represents Austerlitz as seen by a notional "me." I claim no more 
in saying "I remember that I saw Austerlitz." So why should I qual- 
ify my claim? 
* * * 
Some would answer that if I take myself to have an image of Aus- 
terlitz as it looked to Napoleon, then I shouldn't call it a memory, 
because a memory of how Austerlitz looked would have to be a 
memory of how it looked to me. In the view of these philosophers, 
experiential memory necessarily represents things as having been 
experienced by oneself, and it is "immune to error through mis- 
identification" on this score.38 
the formulations in Carol Rovane's "Branching Self-Consciousness" (The 
Philosophical Review 99 (1990): 368ff.). According to Rovane, my image of 
Austerlitz would have to be reported as a quasi-memory of what "I*" 
rather than "I"-saw. 
The resulting similarity between my view and Rovane's is potentially mis- 
leading, however. Rovane introduces "1*" as a "new pronoun" that is 
needed, she believes, because a report of what "I" experienced would pick 
out the subject of that experience as someone identical with me, the sub- 
ject of memory. Since these subjects are not identical in this case, Rovane 
would have me replace the ordinary "I" with a different pronoun. In my 
view, however, the ordinary pronoun used in memory reports is the one 
that should be written as "I*," and it should be written this way precisely 
because it's a quasi-indicator that doesn't pick out the original subject as 
identical with me. I therefore deny that a new pronoun is needed: "1*" is 
just philosophical notation for the first-person pronoun as it is already used 
in memory reports. (For the same reasons, I shall also deny that there is 
any need for the notion of quasi-memory.) 
38For these claims, see Shoemaker, "Persons and their Pasts," and 
Evans, Varieties of Reference, 235-48. More recent discussions include John 
Campbell, "The Reductionist View of the Self," and Andy Hamilton, "A 
New Look at Personal Identity." 
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In my view, however, the nature of experiential memory can be 
fully explained by the fact that it represents things as experienced 
by a notional subject, whom it casts in the notional first-person, as
"me." My memory of seeing something is necessarily a memory of 
my seeing it for the same reason that my image of being someone 
is necessarily an image of my being him-that is, simply because it 
is a first-personal way of thinking about the subject in question.39 
To be sure, such a memory cannot misidentify the viewer in 
representing him as me. But it cannot thereby misidentify the view- 
er, I say, only because it doesn't thereby identify him at all. A visual 
memory represents the viewer as me only in the sense that it rep- 
resents the viewer as the viewer, who occupies first-person position 
in the visual scheme of reference. The original viewer was "me" 
in this sense no matter who he was, just by virtue of being the 
notional subject of the image; and his having been "me" in this 
sense does not entail his having been DV. Memory can thus suc- 
ceed in making someone "me" to me even if he was Napoleon- 
not, of course, by making him the same person as me, but rather 
by presenting him to me in the notional first-person. 
* * * 
The assertion that experiential memory can make Napoleon "me" 
to me sounds like Locke's assertion that memory makes a person 
"self to himself" across time. It therefore suggests a way of rein- 
terpreting Locke's theory of personal identity, by suggesting a per- 
spectival sense in which one can be "self to oneself."40 
39As P. F. Strawson put it: " J] ust as nothing counts as an experience of 
a present state of consciousness which doesn't count as an experience of 
being, oneself; in that state of consciousness, so nothings counts ... as an 
apparent memory of a past state of consciousness which doesn't count as 
an apparent memory of being, oneself; in that state of consciousness. ... 
What we have here is an enriched version of Kant's repeated point about 
the 'I think' merely being the form of consciousness in general" ("Kant's 
Paralogisms: Self-Consciousness and the 'Outside Observer'," in Theorie der 
Subjectivitdt, ed. Konrad Cramer et al. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987), 203- 
19, 216-17). 
40An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Ox- 
ford: Oxford University Press, 1975), bk. 2, chap. 27. See also the following 
passage, in which Kant criticizes the notion that first-personal thought re- 
veals the existence of a persisting mental substance: 
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The word "self" has two related but ultimately distinct strands 
of meaning. It connotes both identity and reflexivity, and either of 
these connotations might dominate when the word serves as a 
noun. On the one hand, a past self of mine might be one and the 
same person as me, identified at some time in the past. On the 
other hand, a past self might be someone in the past whom I can 
think of reflexively, in the first-person. In the first sense, selfhood 
is a metaphysical relation that holds between persons at times, if 
they are the same person. In the second sense, selfhood is a psy- 
chological relation that holds between subjects who are on first- 
personal terms. 
* * * 
Memory really does make a person "self to himself" in the latter 
sense. When I entertain experiential memories, I have thoughts 
that present a past individual to me in the notional first-person. 
Memory thereby recruits past selves for me, by putting them within 
reach of subjectively reflexive thought. 
Locke's memory theory is thus a correct account of perspectival 
selfhood. Of course, Locke clearly intended the theory to be a 
metaphysics of persons. But what if he confused the two?41 Maybe 
Locke got perspectival selfhood right but then mistook it for per- 
sonal identity.42 
Despite the logical identity of the 'I', such a change may have occurred in it 
as does not allow of the retention of its identity, and yet we may ascribe to it 
the same-sounding 'I', which in every different state, even in one involving 
change of the [thinking] subject, might still retain the thought of the preced- 
ing subject and so hand it over to the subsequent subject. (Critique of Pure 
Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 342) 
This passage is related to Locke's argument purporting to show "that two 
thinking Substances may make but one Person" at different times (Essay, 
338). As Kant's version of the argument makes clear, however, what the 
argument really shows is that different thinking substances could be ac- 
cessible to one another's first-personal thought-which, as I am about to 
suggest, makes them one and the same self 
41This interpretation of Locke was suggested by Elizabeth Anscombe in 
"The First Person," 25-26. The present paper can in fact be read as an 
attempt to salvage something of interest from the confusion that Anscombe 
identified in Locke. For a different theory of selfhood as based on reflex- 
ivity rather than identity, see Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 71-114. 
42Here I do not mean to imply that Locke's metaphysics of persons is 
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In order to minimize confusion, let me divide the available 
meanings between the terms selfhoodd" and "personal identity." 
From now on, I'll use selfhoodd" to denote the relation borne to 
me by those whom I can think of first-personally-my grammatical 
person-mates, so to speak, whom I shall call "selves." I'll use "per- 
sonal identity" for the relation among those who are one and the 
same person, and I'll describe them as the same person rather than 
as selves. 
* * * 
If Locke had been clearer-headed, he might have offered a theory 
of selfhood and left it at that. This theory would have had nothing 
to say about whether Napoleon and I are the same person; but it 
would have had plenty to say about whether Napoleon was among 
my past selves. Napoleon was a past self of mine, the theory would 
have said, if I have memories derived from his experiences and 
can therefore think of him in the first-person, just by pointing to 
him unselfconsciously as "me." 
Of course, Napoleon wasn't really a past self of mine. My mem- 
ory of surveying a desolate field may make me think that he was, 
by making me think that he is the referent of the first-person in 
its referential scheme. But the referent of "me" in my memory 
image is the subject from whom the image has been inherited, and 
that person wasn't really NB. 
In reality, let's suppose, my memory is derived from a visual ex- 
perience received on Breed's Hill in 1976, during a Fourth of July 
celebration reenacting a Revolutionary battle. The battlefield rep- 
resented in my memory image must therefore be Breed's Hill rath- 
er than Austerlitz, and the referent of "me" in the image is the 
necessarily wrong. Indeed, one might argue that Locke ended up getting 
the metaphysics of persons right by thinking in perspectival terms. For 
under some conceptions of what persons are, their persistence through 
time might reasonably be thought to depend on relations of first-person 
accessibility between temporally disparate points of view, and hence on 
perspectival selfhood. Yet to say that persons are entities whose identity 
depends on perspectival selfhood is to make a substantive philosophical 
claim, which must not be obscured by a conflation of the metaphysical and 
perspectival notions. (In fact, however, I do not think that a theory of 
perspectival selfhood can serve as a theory of metaphysical identity without 
some modification, for reasons that are explained in note 53, below.) 
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person who stood at its vantage point, undergoing the visual ex- 
perience from which it is derived-DV, as it happens, rather than 
NB.43 
Since NB is not the person whose encounter with the depicted 
scene produced this image, he is not the notional subject of the 
image, and the image doesn't recruit him as one of my former 
selves. He can of course be an imaginary self of mine, since I can 
pretend to have notionally reflexive thoughts about him. But these 
thoughts would not be genuinely reflexive with respect to NB, be- 
cause they would have to be self-consciously centered on him be- 
fore they could point to him, at their center, as "me." Because I 
am not really on first-personal terms with Napoleon, he is not really 
one of my former selves. 
* * * 
A clearer-headed Locke might have offered this theory of selfhood, 
but would we have had any use for it? Isn't personal identity what 
we really care about? If so, the Lockean theory of selfhood would 
have been true but pointless. 
I now want to argue that this theory would not have been point- 
less, because selfhood is of independent philosophical interest. In- 
deed, I think that some of the deepest concerns expressed in terms 
of personal identity are actually perspectival concerns about the 
self. 
In order to address these concerns, however, Locke would have 
had to extend his theory slightly. For they are primarily concerns, 
not about whose past we are remembering, but rather about whose 
future, if any, we are in a position to anticipate. And addressing 
these concerns would have required Locke to extend his theory 
from the past selves who are recruited by memory to the future 
selves who are recruited by anticipation. 
5. Who I Wir Be 
What we most want to know about our survival, I believe, is how 
much of the future we are in a position to anticipate experiencing. 
430n this point, see Hide Ishiguro, "Imagination II," Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 41 (1967): 43, 52. 
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We peer up the stream of consciousness, so to speak, and wonder 
how far up there is still a stream to see. 
To wonder how much of the future I can anticipate experiencing 
is just to wonder how far into the future there will be experiences 
that I am now in a position to prefigure first-personally. If this 
question truly expresses what I want to know about my survival, 
then what I want to know is a matter of perspective rather than 
metaphysics. My question is not how long there will be an individ- 
ual identical with my present self, DV. My question is how long 
there will be someone to occupy the position that is the center of 
my self-centered projections-someone to serve as the referent of 
"me" as it occurs in my prospective thoughts. The future "me" 
whose existence matters here is picked out precisely by his owning 
a point of view into which I am attempting to project my repre- 
sentations of the future, just as a past "me" can be picked out by 
his having owned the point of view from which I have recovered 
representations of the past. 
* * * 
One complication is that in the context of anticipation, the refer- 
ence of "me" may not be determined as it is in the context of 
memory. "I" refers to the notional subject in either case, but the 
notional subject may not be determined in quite the same way. 
Suppose that while preparing for this year's Fourth of July cel- 
ebration, I anticipate my role in the annual reenactment of a Rev- 
olutionary battle. I conjure up a mental image of the climactic 
moment-the field, the tunic, and so on. In its intrinsic features, 
this mental image is no different from that in a memory or an 
imagining. What differentiates it from these images must be how 
it is presented.44 Whereas the image in a memory is presented as 
the vestige of a past experience, for example, the image in antici- 
pation must be presented-or intentionally framed-as prefigur- 
ing a future experience. 
In the case of memory, we noted, the presentation of an image 
does not fully determine its references. Even when I think that I'm 
recalling Napoleon's experiences at Austerlitz, my memory is not 
440n the question of how an image is "presented," see note 18, above. 
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an image of Austerlitz if it is actually derived from a glimpse of 
Breed's Hill.45 But the reverse appears to be true of images framed 
in anticipation. My anticipatory image is of the forthcoming mili- 
tary maneuvers precisely because I think of it as prefiguring my 
experience of those maneuvers. The presentation of this image 
may even consist in an intention on my part, which places the 
image's references under my voluntary control. For I may conjure 
up the image with the express intention of thereby prefiguring the 
experience of playing my role in the reenacted battle-in which 
case the image is of playing my role, as I intend.46 
In this respect, anticipation appears to resemble imagination, 
whose references are similarly determined by an accompanying in- 
tention or stipulation. Unfortunately, this resemblance seems to 
prevent anticipation from providing a context in which I can think 
about future individuals unselfconsciously as "me." In framing a 
mental image with the intention of prefiguring a future experi- 
ence, I have to specify the experience to be prefigured. And in 
order to specify the experience, don't I have to specify its subject? 
If so, I will end up deliberately centering my image on someone, 
and then it won't be a genuinely first-personal thought about him, 
since I won't have picked him out simply by pointing to him at its 
center. He will be at most an imaginary self of mine. Perhaps, then, 
my future selves are all imaginary. 
* * * 
I think that there are indeed modes of anticipation in which I 
project myself into the perspective of the future DV in a manner 
450f course, what places the references of an image under the control 
of its causal history may be its presentation as a recovered experience. After 
all, an image that was actually derived from a glimpse of Breed's Hill could 
subsequently be incorporated into an imagining of Austerlitz-in which 
case its causal history would not prevent the imaginer's intention from 
making it refer to Austerlitz instead of Breed's Hill. But when an image is 
presented as reprising a past experience, its references are thereby hitched 
to its origins in experience, despite concomitant misjudgments as to what 
those origins might be. (Here I am indebted to Michaelis Michael for his 
objections to a purely causal analysis of a memory's references.) 
461 may therefore enjoy infallibility with respect to the references of my 
anticipation. See Wittgenstein's remarks on this subject in The Blue and 
Brown Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), 39. 
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no different from that in which I can project myself into just any- 
one's point of view. In these cases, anticipating my future amounts 
to no more than imagining the future life of DV. But there are 
other modes of anticipation, I think, that are quite unselfconscious 
about the future perspectives they prefigure, and that consequently 
place me on genuinely first-personal terms with future subjects. I 
shall argue that these modes of anticipation ground a distinction 
between real and imaginary future selves. 
One such mode of anticipation is that in which I frame an in- 
tention to do something in the future. Framing an intention entails 
projecting myself into a future perspective because it entails rep- 
resenting the intended action from the point of view of the agent 
who is to perform it. 
Of course, the agent who is to perform any action that I intend 
must be me, since I can't intend the actions of others. But inten- 
tions of doing something are always intentions of my doing it, I 
would argue, in the same sense as memories of seeing something 
are always memories of my seeing it-namely, in the sense that 
these attitudes always have a notional subject, whom they present 
as ''me.'' 
Intentions always have a notional subject because their function 
is to be acted on, and they can be acted on only if they are drawn 
from the agent's point of view. Intentions are consequently framed 
in a referential scheme centered on their potential executor, who 
is thereby thought of as "me," no matter who he will be.47 
* * * 
Intention resembles memory, furthermore, in that I do not have 
to stipulate who its notional subject shall be. For if my intention is 
going to be executed, its executor will have to be the person who 
47This statement oversimplifies a very complicated story. In many cases, 
intentions cannot be framed from the executor's perspective, because his 
perspective cannot yet be fully envisioned. For example, I may intend to 
go north in the future because I cannot yet envision whether going north, 
at the relevant point in my travels, will entail going left or right, backwards 
or straight ahead. But if I intend to go north, my intention is incomplete, 
precisely because it will have to be translated into self-centered terms be- 
fore I can act on it. 
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finds himself in possession of the intention when the time for ex- 
ecuting it arrives. 
An intention must be framed on the assumption that it or its 
mental traces will persist until they can serve as a basis for action.48 
In framing an intention, then, I project my thoughts into the fu- 
ture in two distinct senses. On the one hand, I project my thoughts 
into the future in the sense that I represent the world from a spec- 
ified future point of view. On the other hand, I project my thoughts 
into the future in the sense that I send them into the future, by 
depositing them in memory for future retrieval. And the point of 
view into which I mean to project my thoughts in the first sense is 
simply that point of view into which I shall have projected them in 
the second. That is, I mean to represent an action from that per- 
spective at which this representation will, at the relevant moment, 
be available as a basis on which to act.49 
Thus, I don't have to specify a person from whose point of view 
I am trying to frame my intention, because that point of view is 
fixed by the future causal history of the intention itself. I attempt 
to frame the intention, if you will, from the intention's own future 
perspective, the perspective in which the intention itself will turn 
up to be executed. Just as a memory purports to represent the past 
from the perspective at which it originated in experience, so an 
intention purports to represent the future from the perspective at 
which it will arrive to guide action. In either case, the relevant 
perspective is picked out by the natural history of the representa- 
tion itself; and the referent of "me" in the context is simply who- 
ever fills the role of subject within that perspective. 
As it happens, of course, the perspective at which any intention 
48This assumption need not be distinct from the intention, since part 
of what is intended may be precisely that this very intention persist until 
it can be put into action. See, for example, Gilbert Harman's view that 
intentions refer to themselves as causes of the intended actions (Change in 
View: Principles of Reasoning (Cambridge: MIT Press, Bradford Books, 1986), 
85ff.). 
49T6 speak of the perspective at which the representation itself will be 
available is, of course, to presuppose a theory of diachronic identity for 
mental representations-which may be too much of a presupposition in 
this context. But my references to the storage and retrieval of a single, 
persisting representation can be replaced with references to a momentary 
representation and its causal descendants at later times. The language of 
persisting representations is just an expository convenience. 
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of mine will turn up to be executed, and from which I have there- 
fore tried to frame it, will belong to the future David Velleman. 
This older DV will turn out to occupy the position of notional 
subject in my intention, and so he will turn out to be the person 
of whom I was thinking first-personally in the context. Being ac- 
cessible to unselfconscious first-personal thought on my part, he 
qualifies as my real future self. 
The double projection that characterizes intentions is not confined 
to practical thought, however. Even when I am just picturing the 
future, without planning to do anything in it, I usually regard my 
mental image as entering into a future perspective both represen- 
tationally and causally. I don't just anticipate experiencing the fu- 
ture; I anticipate experiencing it as the payoff of this anticipation, 
as the cadence resolving the present, anticipatory phrase of 
thought. Now, a musical phrase is resolved by its final notes only 
for a listener who is still mindful of how it began. So when I antic- 
ipate experiencing the future as resolving this anticipation, I pic- 
ture it as experienced from a perspective in which this picture is 
recalled. 
This mode of projective thought has a look and feel all its own. 
Within the frame of my anticipatory image, I glimpse a state of 
mind that will include a memory of its having been glimpsed 
through this frame-as if the image were a window through which 
to climb into the prefigured experience.50 Anticipating the future 
in this manner, I once again look to future selves unselfconsciously. 
I don't specify the notional subject of my anticipatory image. He 
is simply the person who will confront the envisioned future with 
this image at his back, glimpsed in memory as the image through 
which his state was glimpsed in anticipation. And he is a real future 
self of mine because, as the one who will experience the imagined 
future from the other side of this image, he is picked out by the 
natural history of the image, as the person whom it presents in the 
notional first-person. 
50This "window" is unfortunately not a WYSIWYG environment: What 
You See looking through it Is not necessarily What You Get upon climbing 
through. 
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* * * 
Finally, my allusions to future subjects can be unselfconscious with- 
out necessarily involving the thought that they themselves will be 
remembered. My prior image of an event may produce various 
other thoughts, emotions, or inclinations whose remnants will col- 
or a future experience of the event even if no memory of the image 
itself remains. I can then picture the event as experienced in the 
psychological wake of this picture, whether or not a memory of 
itself will be among the items that the picture leaves in its wake. 
If the wake of an experiential image is expected to wash over 
the prefigured experience, the image may then be constrained in 
what it can justifiably portray. I'm hardly entitled to anticipate an 
event as being experienced with shock and disbelief from a per- 
spective that will have been influenced even indirectly by this an- 
ticipation, since the event is unlikely to incite either shock or dis- 
belief in a mind bearing the traces of its having been hereby an- 
ticipated. Conversely, there may be events that I'm entitled to an- 
ticipate as being met with equanimity only from a future 
perspective that will retain traces of this anticipation. 
What will transpire in perspectives that intercommunicate with 
mine in this fashion matters more to me than what will transpire 
in other perspectives. Indeed, my epistemic relation to these per- 
spectives may partly constitute their mattering to me. To imagine 
a future pain, for example, as it will feel in the psychological wake 
of my hereby imagining it is to do more than just imagine it. It's 
to imagine the pain as befalling a mind that has somehow been 
prepared by this very prospect of its occurrence. And to imagine 
a pain as experienced by a mind hereby so prepared for it is al- 
ready to brace for the pain, to shrink from it, or to be otherwise 
caught up in it in some way. Anticipation that's cognizant of its 
effect on the prefigured experiences is thus a form of mental en- 
gagement with them that, to some degree, already constitutes their 
mattering. 
This engagement with future experiences coincides, of course, 
with an ability to regard their subjects unselfconsciously as "me." 
When I frame an image prefiguring an experience that will follow 
in the image's wake, causally speaking, I needn't specify for whom 
the experience will follow: in the context of the image, the expe- 
rience is simply "to follow"-to follow the image itself, that is. The 
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image thus prefigures the experience simply as forthcoming, and 
so it provides a context for thinking about the subject of that ex- 
perience unselfconsciously as "me." 
6. Why "Me"? 
In sum, anticipation that engages its object tends to be genuinely 
first-personal, and vice versa. This association may help to explain 
why I care about my future selves: they are the persons whose ex- 
periences I cannot prefigure without already being caught up in 
them, as lying in the wake of this anticipation. 
But the association between selfhood and engaged anticipation 
is merely an association, which can sometimes fail, if not in reality, 
then at least in imaginary circumstances. The question therefore 
arises whether I care about my selves only in virtue of my psycho- 
logical engagement with them. Or do I care about my selves as 
such? 
The best way to approach this question will be to entertain an 
imaginary case in which selfhood and psychological engagement 
come apart. I will therefore conclude with a brief discussion of a 
familiar philosophical fiction. 
* * * 
Imagine that my brain will be divided and each half transplanted 
into a different body, with the result that two people will wake up 
tomorrow remembering my past and carrying on my anticipations 
and intentions for the future.5' If I know what is in store for me, 
I can frame anticipations today that will have effects on, and per- 
haps be remembered in, two different perspectives tomorrow. 
Hence I can actively anticipate the future as experienced by two 
different people. 
Even so, I cannot make either person the notional subject of my 
anticipations unselfconsciously. Suppose that I try to think ahead 
into some future moment at which I shall have two psychological 
51See David Wiggins, Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1967), 50; and Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 254ff. Parfit says (n. 
40), "I decided to study philosophy almost entirely because I was en- 
thralled by Wiggins's imagined case." 
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successors. If I try to picture the moment as it will appear in an 
experience specified merely as forthcoming, or to follow, I won't 
succeed in picking out the perspective from which I'm trying to 
picture it, since my picture may be followed, in the relevant sense, 
by two different experiences of the moment in question, and I 
cannot be trying to draw it from both perspectives at once. Simi- 
larly, my anticipation may be remembered in two different per- 
spectives, and so I cannot frame it from a perspective specified 
merely as that in which it will be remembered. 
In order to specify the perspective from which I'm trying to 
picture the future, I'll have to identify it with one of my psycho- 
logical successors or the other.52 That is, I'll have to pick out the 
person whose perspective is the intended target and destination of 
my projective thoughts-whereupon I'll be doing exactly what I do 
when imagining that I am Napoleon. My anticipation of the future 
will be nothing more than an act of imagination. 
* * * 
By depriving me of unique future perspectives, fission would de- 
prive me of real future selves.53 It wouldn't prevent me from being 
fully engaged with both successors, however, since both lie in the 
causal path of my present thoughts. The question is whether an- 
ticipatory engagement with them would preserve all that matters 
about survival. Would I suffer a significant loss in having no subject 
with whom I was on genuinely first-personal terms? 
My inclination is to say that I would indeed suffer a loss. I could 
52This point figures prominently in Rovane's "Branching Self-Con- 
sciousness." 
53Note that first-person reference is asymmetrical in this case. Although 
I cannot refer first-personally to the products of my fission, they can refer 
first-personally to me, in the context of their experiential memories. This 
result strikes me as intuitively correct. When I imagine undergoing fission 
tomorrow, I don't seem to have much of a future; but when I imagine that 
I am the product of fission that occurred yesterday, I still seem to have a 
complete past. (This intuition is shared by Simon Blackburn, "Has Kant 
Refuted Parfit?") This result also demonstrates that selfhood, defined per- 
spectivally, cannot coincide with the identity of a person, since selfhood 
turns out to be asymmetric whereas relations of identity cannot. 
For the claim that "creatures involved in fission and fusion could have 
nothing like our ordinary use of the first person," see John Campbell, Past, 
Space, and Self; 97. Campbell bases this claim on very different grounds. 
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no longer think just about how the future would look; I'd have to 
think about how it would look to particular, specified observers. I 
could no longer plan just to act; I'd have to plan actions to be 
performed by particular, specified agents. I could no longer imagine 
a future as existing simply on the other side of this image; I'd have 
to imagine it as existing on one or another of the image's "other 
sides," in the lives of one or another of my psychological successors. 
Here I am tempted to borrow again from Bernard Williams, by 
saying that my relations with successors-by-fission would always in- 
volve "one thought too many." Williams coined this phrase to ex- 
press the loss of intimacy that a Kantian moral agent would suffer 
in relations with others.54 I, too, am using the phrase to express a 
loss of intimacy, but the intimacy lost in this case would be in re- 
lation to my own psychological successors, and the excess thought 
would simply be the thought of who they were. In cases of fission, 
I would have to identify particular successors before I could enter 
their perspectives: there would be no future perspectives that I 
could enter without a second thought. And the second thought of 
whose perspective I was entering would be an alienating thought, 
one too many for the intimacy that holds among selves. 
In some respects, of course, I would still be in a position to an- 
ticipate the lives of my successors "from the inside," as we some- 
times say. In particular, I would be able to project my thoughts into 
their perspectives both causally and representationally, sending into 
their points of view images drawn from those points of view. But in 
another respect I would no longer be in a position to anticipate any 
future life from the inside, since there would be no life that I could 
anticipate without first picking it out for the purpose of projecting 
myself into it. Surely, a position from which I must deliberately pro- 
ject myself into a life is not a position on the inside of that life. 
My sense, then, is that the ability to prefigure future experiences 
unselfconsciously is an important part of having a future at all. Not 
being just plain "me" to myself would be more than the loss of a 
pronoun; it would be the loss of a self-intimacy that is part of what 
matters about having future selves. 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
54"Persons, Character, and Morality," in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cam- 
bridge University Press, 1981), 1-19. 
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